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FAMILY AND JUVENILE LAW
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past year, family and juvenile law in the Common-
wealth was affected by three cases from the Supreme Court of the
United States and a considerable amount of legislation enacted
by the 2004 Session of the Virginia General Assembly. By way of
example, on June 25, 2004, the Supreme Court of Virginia
amended its appellate rules to include guardians ad litem
("GAL") for children. Along with the Guardian ad litem Stan-
dards, which took effect in September 2003, there is now a sig-
nificantly higher benchmark to be met by GALs. The General As-
sembly also enacted legislation to provide for earlier appointment
of lawyers as counsel for juveniles in delinquency cases; however,
that provision does not take effect until July 2005. This is about
the same time that higher appointment standards for such law-
yers are to be established by the new Indigent Defense Commis-
sion. Thus, there is much in the works for lawyers who represent
children and families in the Commonwealth.
II. GUARDIANS AD LITEM
As discussed extensively in last year's Annual Survey of Vir-
ginia Law,' major developments took place between 2001 and
2003 which reformed the Virginia's guardian ad litem system.
These developments created performance standards for GALs in a
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variety of cases.2 The new standards went into effect on July 1,
2003, and were reinforced by the Supreme Court of Virginia's
adoption of amended appellate rules that facilitate GAL partici-
pation in the appeals process.' Rule 5A:1 was amended to provide
that the term "Counsel for appellee... include a Guardian Ad
Litem, unless the Guardian Ad Litem is the appellant."4 Rule
5A:19(c)(3) was further revised to provide that, "[t]he appellant
may file a reply brief in the office of the clerk of the Court of Ap-
peals within 14 days after filing of the brief of appelle" or GAL.'
Rule 5A:19(d) now states:
If a Guardian Ad Litem joins with either appellant or appellee, the
Guardian Ad Litem must notify the Clerk's Office, in writing, which
side it joins. Thereafter, the Guardian Ad Litem may rely on the
brief of that party and is entitled to oral argument under Rule
5A:26.
6
Finally, the new rules state that
[ilf a Guardian Ad Litem joins with either appellant or appellee, the
Guardian Ad Litem shall share the time for oral argument with the
party. If a Guardian Ad Litem wants additional time to argue, the
Guardian Ad Litem must state that request in its brief, subject to
approval of the court.
7
In Watkins v. Fairfax County Department of Family Services,'
the Court of Appeals of Virginia reaffirmed its prior holdings that
the GAL was an indispensable party to an appeal of a circuit
court judgment terminating a mother's parental rights.9 Thus,
the failure to name the GAL in the notice of appeal, or accompa-
nying certificate of service, was fatal to the perfection of the
2. Id. at 164-68.
3. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:1 (Repl. Vol 2004). The amendments discussed in this sec-
tion are all available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/amend.htm (last visited Sept. 24,
2004). The amend-ed rules took effect September 1, 2004. See id.
4. Id. at 5A:l(b)(6) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
5. Id. at 5A:19(c)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
6. Id. at 5A:19(d) (Repl. Vol. 2004). If the GAL ils a separate brief, the brief must
have a brown cover. Id. at 5A:24 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
7. Id. at 5A:28(b) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
8. 42 Va. App. 760, 595 S.E.2d 19 (Ct. App. 2004).
9. Id. at 770-71, 595 S.E.2d at 24-25. See also M.G. v. Albemarle County Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 41 Va. App. 170, 177, 583 S.E.2d 761, 764 (Ct. App. 2003); Hughes v. York
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 36 Va. App. 22, 26, 548 S.E.2d 237, 238-39 (Ct. App. 2001).
[Vol. 39:241
FAMILY AND JUVENILE LAW
mother's appeal in the case; therefore, the appeal was dis-
missed."°
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 32.1-
127.1:03" to bring Virginia's policy regarding the availability of
client medical records into compliance with the federal Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act. 2 The amendments
continue to provide access to these records; however, the proce-
dures for obtaining them were further outlined. 3 The General
Assembly also amended Virgnia Code section 16.1-267, which dis-
cusses the compensation of GALs. 4 The amendment removed the
$100 compensation cap stating that
[t]he court shall assess costs against the parents for such legal ser-
vices in the maximum amount of that awarded the attorney by the
court under the circumstances of the case, considering such factors
as the ability of the parents to pay and the nature and extent of the
counsel's duties in the case. Such amount shall not exceed the maxi-
mum amount specified in subdivision 1 of § 19.2-163 .... 15
In at least two separate cases, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
has noted the failure of a GAL to participate in the appeal by ei-
ther filing a brief or otherwise participating in the appellate proc-
ess. In Brown v. Spotsylvania Department of Social Services," the
court was very explicit in its admonishment,
The record reflects that the guardian ad litem for D.B. was provided
notice pursuant to Rule 5A:6. He did not file a responsive brief with
this Court, however. Standard J. of the Standards to Govern the Per-
formance of Guardians Ad Litem for Children, effective September 1,
2003, calls for all guardians ad litem to "[flile appropriate.., briefs
and appeals on behalf of the child and ensure that the child is repre-
sented by a [guardian ad litem] in any appeal involving the case."V7
10. Watkins at 775, 595 S.E.2d at 27.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1320d-8 (2000).
13. Act of Mar. 11, 2004, ch. 66, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16.1-266, -343 (Supp. 2004), 32.1-127.1:03 (Repl. Vol. 2004), 37.1-67.3, -134.9, -
134.12, and -134.21 (Cum. Supp. 2004)). Virginia Code section 16.1-266 does not take ef-
fect until July 1, 2005.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-267 (Supp. 2004).
15. Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 342, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-267 (Supp. 2004)).
16. 43 Va. App. 205, 597 S.E.2d 214 (Ct. App. 2004).
17. Id. at 209 n.1, 597 S.E.2d at 216 n.1 (quoting STANDARDS TO GOVERN THE
PERFORMANCE OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM FOR CHILDREN (2003), available at
20041
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In C.S. v. Virginia Beach Departmentt of Social Services"8 the
court also noted the absence of participation by the GAL.19 In an
unpublished opinion, the court of appeals held that the circuit
court acted properly in holding a parent in civil contempt for fail-
ing to pay half of the GAL's fee assessed against the parties at the
conclusion of a disputed custody case.2°
III. FAMILY LAW
A. The Pledge of Allegiance Case
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,21 which burst
into public consciousness as the "pledge of allegiance case,"22 was
originally viewed as an Establishment Clause conflict. The reso-
lution of the case ultimately rested not on First Amendment
grounds, but rather on the right of a parent to assert constitu-
tional claims on behalf of his child.23 The Court decided the case,
not on the merits of the constitutionality of the inclusion of "un-
der God" in the pledge of allegiance, but on the much narrower
ground of Michael Newdow's standing to challenge the practice as
the non-custodial parent of his daughter whose rights he was as-
serting.24 Under the "domestic relations" exception to federal
court jurisdiction, the question of the father's ability to serve as
his daughter's "next friend" was governed by California family
law.25 The California family court ordered "joint legal custody,"
but gave the child's mother the power to "makeD the final deci-
sions if the two ... disagree," thus denying the father the right to
litigate as the daughter's "next friend."26 Finding that Newdow
http://www.courts.state.va.us/gal/gal-standards-children_080403.html (last visited Sept.
24, 2004).
18. 41 Va. App. 557, 586 S.E.2d 884 (Ct. App. 2003).
19. Id. at 560 n.2, 586 S.E.2d at 885 n.2.
20. Walker-Duncan v. Duncan, No. 1752-03-1, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 26, at *9 (Ct.
App. Jan. 20, 2004) (unpublished decision).
21. 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
22. For further discussion of the Newdow case in the education law context, see D.
Patrick Lacy, Jr. & Kathleen S. Mehfoud, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Education Law,
39 U. RICH. L. REV. 183, 184-86 (2004).
23. 124 S. Ct. at 2312.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2309-10.
26. Id. at 2310, 2312. The Court noted that this issue was not directly raised until the
[Vol. 39:241
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could not, under California law, serve as his daughter's next
friend, the Court held that, "Newdow lacks prudential standing to
bring this suit in federal court," and thus reversed the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.27
B. Marriage
In response to the Attorney General's opinion that changes
made at the 2003 legislative session deprived appointed marriage
celebrants of their power to celebrate marriages across the Com-
monwealth,28 the General Assembly amended the Virginia Code
to again allow circuit court judges to appoint persons who are
residents of the circuit in which the judge sits to perform mar-
riages anywhere in the Commonwealth.29 More controversial leg-
islation, described as the "Affirmation of Marriage Act," provides
that "[a] civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement
between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privi-
leges or obligations of marriage is prohibited."30 Furthermore,
such arrangements entered into in another state or jurisdiction
are void in Virginia and "any contractual rights created thereby
shall be void and unenforceable."3' Opponents of the enactment
argued that it could impair contractual obligations in Virginia
that are unrelated to a so-called "gay marriage."3 2 Governor Mark
Warner unsuccessfully sought to amend the legislation by delet-
ing the reference to a "partnership contract or other arrange-
ment" and striking the clause invalidating contractual arrange-
ments.33
mother raised it following the court of appeals' first order in the case. Id. at 2307-08. The
California family court initially granted the mother sole legal custody. Id. at 10. After the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its decision, the California
family court held another hearing whereupon it granted the joint legal custody described
above. Id
27. Id. at 2312.
28. See Op. to Hon. Michael D. Wolfe, Clerk (Oct. 10, 2003), available at http://www.
oag.state.va.us (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
29. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 612, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-25 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
31. Id.
32. David Weintraub & Kirk Marusak, Letter to the Editor: Affirming Inequality in
Virginia, WASH. POST, Sun. July 25, 2004, at B06, available at http://www.washington.
post.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A12245-2004Jul24 (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
33. The Governor's recommendation may be found at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/
20041
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C. Family Abuse and Protective Orders
One case decided by the Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed
the modification of protective orders. In Shaffer v. Shaffer,34 the
court of appeals concluded that it was unable to review a hus-
band's claim that a modification of a protective order, which de-
leted a provision giving his wife exclusive use and possession of
their residence, should have also dropped the "no contact" provi-
sion because the husband's argument had not been presented to
the trial court.35
The General Assembly made a number of revisions to the vari-
ous sections of the Virginia Code that dealt with family abuse and
protective orders during the 2004 session. Virginia Code section
16.1-260 now requires juvenile court intake officers to "provide to
a person seeking a protective order... a written explanation of
the conditions, procedures and time limits applicable to the issu-
ance of protective orders" for family and household members.36
Virginia Code section 9.1-102 requires the Department of Crimi-
nal Justice Services to "[e] stablish training standards and publish
a model policy for law-enforcement personnel in the handling
of... sexual assault and stalking cases"37 and to "[e]stablish
training standards and publish a model policy and protocols for
local and regional sexual assault response teams."38 Virginia Code
section 19.2-81.4 also requires the Virginia State Police and local
law enforcement agencies to institute policies that guide officers
on domestic violence incidents involving the police and repeat of-
fenders.39 Virginia Code section 63.2-1502 directs the Department
of Social Services "[to establish minimum training requirements
for workers and supervisors on family abuse and domestic vio-
lence, including the relationship between domestic violence and
legp504.exe?041+amd+HB751AG (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
34. No. 1945-03-2, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 269 (Ct. App. Jun. 8, 2004) (unpublished de-
cision).
35. Id. at *12. The court based its ruling on Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5A:18, the
purpose of which, "is to insure that the trial court and opposing party are given the oppor-
tunity to intelligently address, examine, and resolve issues in the trial court, thus avoiding
unnecessary appeals." Id. at *11 (citing Weidman v. Babcock, 241 Va. 40, 44, 400 S.E.2d
164, 167 (1991)).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-260(C) (Supp. 2004).
37. Id. § 9.1-102(37) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
38. Id. § 9.1-102(46) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
39. Id. § 19.2-81.4(6), (7) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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child abuse and neglect." ° "[T]he Office of the Executive Secre-
tary of the Supreme Court shall determine appropriate standards
for the approval of education and treatment programs for persons
accused of assault and battery against a family or household
member.., and arrange for such programs to be approved by an
appropriate entity."4' Virginia Code section 16.1-279.1 now pro-
vides that temporary child support may be one of the conditions
imposed on a respondent in a protective order.4 ' A respondent
who "commits an assault and battery upon any party protected by
the protective order, resulting in serious bodily injury to the
party... is guilty of a Class 6 felony."43 Furthermore, a respon-
dent who violates the protective order "by furtively entering the
home of any protected party while the party is present, or by en-
tering and remaining in the home of the protected party until the
protected party arrives, is guilty of a Class 6 felony."' The term
"primary physical aggressor" was changed to "predominant
physical aggressor" in Virginia Code section 19.2-81.3, which re-
quires arrest in most cases when the officer has probable cause to
believe that either family assault or a violation of a protective or-
der has occurred. 5 A police officer is required to "arrest and take
into custody the person he has probable cause to believe, based on
the totality of the circumstances, was the predominant physical
aggressor unless there are special circumstances which would
dictate a course of action other than an arrest."46
The General Assembly also amended the criminal code in fam-
ily abuse situations. Virginia Code section 18.2-57.2 now states
that
40. Id. § 63.2-1502(13) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
41. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 979, 2004 Va. Acts.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A1) (Supp. 2004).
43. Id. § 16.1-253.2 (Supp. 2004).
44. Id.
45. Act of Apr. 21, 2004, ch. 1016, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-81.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004). The statute also sets standards for
determining who is the predominant physical aggressor:
The standards for determining who is the predominant physical aggressor
shall be based on the following considerations: (i) who was the first aggressor,
(ii) the protection of the health and safety of family and household members,
(iii) prior complaints of family abuse by the allegedly abusing person involv-
ing the family or household members, (iv) the relative severity of the injuries
inflicted on persons involved in the incident, (v) whether any injuries were in-
flicted in self-defense, (vi) witness statements, and (vii) other observations.
20041
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[ulpon a conviction for assault and battery against a family or
household member, where it is alleged... [the] person has been pre-
viously convicted of two offenses against a family or household mem-
ber of (i) assault and battery... (ii) malicious wounding ... (iii) ag-
gravated malicious wounding... (iv) malicious bodily injury by
means of a substance.., or (v) an offense under the law of any other
jurisdiction which has the same elements as any of the above of-
fenses, in any combination, all of which occurred within a period of
20 years, and each of which occurred on a different date, such person
is guilty of a Class 6 felony.
47
Virginia Code section 18.2-57.3 allows a court to order a person
"charged with [a] first offense of assault and battery against a
family or household member" to be placed on probation and to
participate in a community-based probation program as part of
deferred proceedings.4"
D. The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
The 2004 General Assembly established civil law protections
for service members, thus bringing Virginia law into parity with
federal law. Under the new provisions, a Virginia court cannot
enter a default judgment absent an affidavit from the plaintiff
stating whether the defendant is in military service or that the
plaintiff does not know if he is in such service.49 The amendments
also authorize the courts to set aside any default judgment
against service members, as provided by federal law."
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004). Previously, the Class 6 felony ap-
plied only if the prior convictions were for assault and battery against a family or house-
hold member. Id. § 18.2-57.2 (Cum. Supp. 2003). Another bill enacted this year revised the
time period from ten to twenty years in which the three convictions must occur in order
that the third one be a Class 6 felony. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 738, 2004 Va. Acts
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004). Further legislative enactments affect
how civilian courts respond to domestic abuse cases involving active members of the
armed services. "If any active duty member of the United States Armed Forces is found
guilty" of the assault and battery of a household member, the court is required to "report
the conviction to family advocacy representatives of the United States Armed Forces." VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.4 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-15.2 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
50. Id.
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E. Divorce
In De Avies v. De Avies5' the Court of Appeals of Virginia ruled
that a party to a divorce decree cannot seek to have the decree set
aside, eighteen months later, on the ground that the final decree
was endorsed only by counsel and not signed by the parties. 2 The
parties to the case appeared in court for an ore tenus hearing and
announced that they had settled all the outstanding issues. 3 In
open court, counsel read into the record the details of their un-
derstanding, and the parties confirmed to the judge that they
were in agreement.54 A week later, counsel submitted to the trial
court a detailed final decree tracking provision-by-provision the
agreement reached in open court."" The agreement was signed by
both parties' counsel.56 The judge entered the decree on March 15,
2000; no post-judgment motions were filed nor was an appeal
noted.57 In September 2002, the husband filed a "Motion to Va-
cate Final Decree as to Property and Support," arguing that the
agreements were not signed by the parties themselves; the trial
judge denied the motion." The court of appeals affirmed the lower
court's ruling, concluding that, even if the order was voidable, it
was nevertheless a court order and could not be attacked collat-
erally.59
In Budnick v. Budnick ° the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's award of a divorce to a wife where the husband was con-
victed of a felony and sentenced to pay a substantial fine and
serve a lengthy period of incarceration.6' The court also ruled that
there was no abuse of discretion in the distribution of the prop-
erty, the award of child support, and the reservation of spousal
51. 42 Va. App. 342, 592 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 2004).
52. Id. at 347, 592 S.E.2d at 353.
53. Id. at 344, 592 S.E.2d at 351-52.
54. Id. at 344, 592 S.E.2d at 352.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 344-45, 592 S.E.2d at 352.
58. Id. at 345, 592 S.E.2d at 352.
59. Id. at 346-47, 592 S.E.2d at 353 (citing Pope v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 451,
456, 559 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2002)).
60. 42 Va. App. 823, 595 S.E.2d 50 (Ct. App. 2004).
61. Id. at 831, 595 S.E.2d at 54.
2004]
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support because the criminal activity had a devastating financial
impact on the family and constituted marital waste.62
F. Property Settlement Agreements
The Court of Appeals of Virginia ruled in Hale v. Hale6 3 that a
property settlement agreement, which provided the wife with a
fifty percent share in the husband's "vested pension plan with his
employer," included both the husband's 401(k) defined contribu-
tion plan and the defined benefit pension plan, since both were
part of the husband's total retirement plan.64 Both plans were
considered "employer provided," even though the employer con-
tributed only partially to the 401(k) plan. Since the agreement
referred to the employer-provided benefits in the plural, the wife
had an interest in both under equitable distribution.66 The court
of appeals held in Jacobsen v. Jacobsen67 that the evidence sup-
ported the trial court's conclusion that the husband and wife did
not reconcile after their separation.6" The court noted that the
husband had engaged in a "sham reconciliation" with his wife for
the sole purpose of getting the house back.69 As there was no real
reconciliation, the marital settlement agreement, giving the wife
sole possession of the house, was incorporated into the divorce de-
cree. In an unpublished opinion, Brewerton v. O'Meara,7 ° the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment that the hus-
band was responsible for a daughter's education expenses, pursu-
ant to the marital agreement incorporated in their Massachusetts
divorce decree.7 Finally, in Vinson v. Vinson,72 the court of ap-
peals affirmed the decision of the circuit court setting aside a
property settlement agreement prepared by an attorney who ac-
cepted a retainer agreement with both the husband and the wife
62. Id. at 845-46, 595 S.E.2d at 61.
63. 42 Va. App. 27, 590 S.E.2d 66 (Ct. App. 2003).
64. Id. at 32-33, 590 S.E.2d at 68.
65. Id. at 32, 590 S.E.2d at 68.
66. Id. at 33, 590 S.E.2d at 68.
67. 41 Va. App. 582, 586 S.E.2d 896 (Ct. App. 2003).
68. Id. at 592-93, 586 S.E.2d at 900-01.
69. Id. at 592, 586 S.E.2d at 900.
70. No. 0801-03-2, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 535 (Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2003) (unpublished
decision).
71. Id. at *5.
72. 41 Va. App. 675, 588 S.E.2d 392 (Ct. App. 2003).
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for an uncontested divorce.73 The court also affirmed an order
sanctioning the attorney for his failure to conduct a reasonable
inquiry into the possible conflict of interest presented by the rep-




Two cases decided this year by the Court of Appeals of Virginia
concerned the interpretation of prenuptial contracts. In Smith v.
Smith" the court of appeals ruled that the circuit court errone-
ously refused to enforce a prenuptial agreement on the ground
that it was unclear and imprecise when both parties seemed to
agree on what it meant.76 The equitable distribution of the other
property, however, was reasonable.77 The court therefore reversed
in part and affirmed in part.7" In Golembiewski v. Golembiewski,79
an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's decision that a prenuptial contract waived equitable dis-
tribution,"° concluding that the agreement governed only sepa-
rately acquired property and not marital property."1
Disputes concerning the classification of property as marital or
separate dominated several cases. In Utsch v. Utsch"2 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia concluded that where the husband con-
veyed the marital residence-his separate property-to himself
and his wife as tenants by the entirety without consideration,
"the deed of gift was unambiguous on its face, both for the pur-
pose of retitling and proof of donative intent," and parol evidence
was therefore inadmissible. 3 The supreme court remanded the
case back to the court of appeals to address the issue of the classi-
73. Id. at 683-84, 588 S.E.2d at 396-97.
74. Id. at 687, 588 S.E.2d at 398.
75. 43 Va. App. 279, 597 S.E.2d 250 (Ct. App. 2004).
76. Id. at 287-88, 597 S.E.2d at 254-55.
77. Id. at 286, 597 S.E.2d at 253-54.
78. Id. at 291, 597 S.E.2d at 256.
79. No. 2993-02-1, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 507 (Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2003) (unpublished de-
cision).
80. Id. at *6.
81. Id. at *11.
82. 266 Va. 127, 581 S.E.2d 508 (2003).
83. Id. at 127, 581 S.E.2d at 508.
2004]
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fication of the marital residence as marital property for the pur-
pose of equitable distribution.14 In Fowlkes v. Fowlkes5 the su-
preme court found that the husband's pre- and post-marriage
contribution of separate funds to the building of an addition to
the wife's house, which became the marital residence, did not
transmute the property into partly separate and partly marital. 6
As the property remained the separate property of the wife, it
was not subject to equitable distribution. 7 The court further
noted that the husband must turn to equity to recover his in-
vestment."8 In Anderson v. Anderson,89 the Court of Appeals of
Virginia agreed with the trial court's determination that the wife
could be awarded a credit for the fair rental value of the marital
home, as part of the equitable distribution award, where the hus-
band rented part of the property after the wife moved out.9"
In valuing the husband's fifty percent interest in a jointly
owned family business, the court of appeals in Owens v. Owens91
determined that the circuit court properly refused to grant a "mi-
nority discount" because the ownership was less than fifty-one
percent.92 The lower court correctly applied Virginia's "intrinsic
value" concept in assessing the value for equitable distribution
purposes.93 In Buchanan v. Buchanan,94 the Supreme Court of
Virginia ruled that the trial court correctly allowed a wife to pur-
sue payment from the husband under the fraudulent conveyance
statute since the husband transferred property eleven months af-
ter the parties separated and shortly before he filed for divorce.95
84. Id. at 130, 581 S.E.2d at 510.
85. 42 Va. App. 1, 590 S.E.2d 53 (Ct. App. 2003).
86. Id. at 9, 590 S.E.2d at 56-57.
87. Id.
88. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 57.
89. 42 Va. App. 643, 593 S.E.2d 824 (Ct. App. 2004).
90. Id. at 648, 593 S.E.2d at 826.
91. 41 Va. App. 844, 589 S.E.2d 488 (Ct. App. 2003).
92. Id. at 855-56, 589 S.E.2d at 494.
93. Id. at 854, 589 S.E.2d at 494. "Intrinsic value is a very subjective concept that
looks to the worth of the property to the parties." Id. at 854, 589 S.E.2d at 493 (quoting
Howell v. Howell, 31 Va. App. 332, 339, 523 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2000)). "The intrinsic value
principle," the court noted, "applies to stock in a family owned company." Id., 589 S.E.2d
at 494.
94. 266 Va. 207, 585 S.E.2d 533 (2003).
95. Id. at 213, 585 S.E.2d at 536. An amendment to Virginia Code section 20-107.3
adds the use or expenditure of marital property by either of the parties for a nonmarital,
separate purpose or the dissipation of such funds when such was done in anticipation of
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In a significant case, Courembis v. Courembis,96 the Court of
Appeals of Virginia ruled that an "increase in value to separate
property attributable to the significant personal contributions of
either party renders that increase marital property" subject to
equitable distribution.97 This was a matter of first impression to
the court,9" which found that the marital contribution increases
the value of separate property, thus rendering it subject to equi-
table distribution.99
H. Child and Spousal Support
In Princiotto v. Gorrell,'° the court of appeals affirmed the cir-
cuit court's ruling, which ordered the father to pay the children's
expenses directly, instead of to the mother because of her alleged
financial irresponsibility.'' In Hatloy v. Hatloy °2 the court of ap-
peals ruled that the trial court had appropriately reduced the
husband's child support obligation after finding that he should be
imputed his current pay, rather than the pay from his former
job.10 3 On the other hand, in Jones v. Davis1°4 the court reversed
the trial court's ruling which allowed the father a credit against
arrearages for non-conforming child support payments while, at
the wife's request, the child was in his custody.0 5
A trial court's imposition of sanctions against a litigant and his
attorney were affirmed by the court of appeals in Fox v. Fox.°6
The court ruled that "the husband was afforded an opportunity to
be heard," on his motion to correct his child support arrearage, al-
divorce or separation, or after the last separation of the parties to the factors that the
court is directed to consider in determining the "division or transfer of jointly owned mari-
tal property, and the amount of any monetary award, the apportionment of marital debts,
and the method of payment." Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 757, 2004 Va. Acts __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(10) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
96. 43 Va. App. 18, 595 S.E.2d 505 (Ct. App. 2004).
97. Id. at 32, 595 S.E.2d at 512.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 33, 595 S.E.2d at 513.
100. 42 Va. App. 253, 590 S.E.2d 626 (Ct. App. 2004).
101. Id. at 261, 590 S.E.2d at 630.
102. 41 Va. App. 667, 588 S.E.2d 389 (Ct. App. 2003).
103. Id. at 674, 588 S.E.2d at 392.
104. 43 Va. App. 9, 595 S.E.2d 501 (Ct. App. 2004).
105. Id. at 16, 595 S.E.2d at 504.
106. 41 Va. App. 88, 98, 581 S.E.2d 904, 909 (Ct. App. 2003).
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though, by refusing to post bond, he did not avail himself of that
opportunity.'0 7 In Tucker v. Wimer,'0° the court of appeals ruled
that the father could not challenge an earlier paternity determi-
nation in a proceeding to collect his support arrearage, on the
ground that he was not appointed a committee because he was
incarcerated in jail, as opposed to the penitentiary.'0 9
The General Assembly clarified that the retroactive modifica-
tion of a child support order is not dependent on the court in
which the petition was originally filed."0 Child support orders
may be modified retroactively to the date that the petition for
modification was filed in the original court."'
The General Assembly also revised Virginia's child support
guidelines to exclude from "gross income" any "[ilncome received
by the payor from secondary employment income.., where the
payor obtained the income to discharge a child support arrear-
age."" 2 Furthermore, "[tihe cessation of such secondary in-
come... shall not be the basis for a material change in circum-
stances upon which a modification of child support may be
based.""3 In regard to medical treatment, the General Assembly
replaced "extraordinary medical and dental expenses" with a re-
quirement that "the parents pay in proportion to their gross in-
comes.., any reasonable and necessary unreimbursed medical or
dental expenses that are in excess of $250 for any calendar year
for each child who is subject of the obligation.""' The computation
107. Id. at 95, 581 S.E.2d at 907-08. An attempted appeal from a juvenile and domestic
relations district court to a circuit court in a child support case was unsuccessful because
of the respondent's failure to file an appeal bond. Jones v. Commonwealth, No. 2376-03-3,
2004 Va. App. LEXIS 251, at *3-4 (Ct. App. June 1, 2004) (unpublished decision).
108. 42 Va. App. 42, 590 S.E.2d 73 (Ct. App. 2003).
109. Id. at 43, 590 S.E.2d at 73. Virginia law provides a committee through which in-
carcerated persons may assert their rights while in prison. Id. at 45, 590 S.E.2d at 74. "A
court's authority to appoint and a committee's powers to act are conditioned 'upon the fact
of conviction and sentence to confinement to the penitentiary... .'" Id. (quoting Merchant's
v. Schry, 116 Va. 437, 445, 82 S.E. 106, 109 (1914)).
110. Act of Mar. 29, 2004, ch. 204, 2004 Va. Acts- (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16.1-278.18 (Supp. 2004), 20-74, -108, -108.1, -112 (Repl. Vol. 2004), 63.2-1916
(Cum. Supp. 2004)).
111. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-278.18 (Supp. 2004), 20-74, -108, -108.1, -112 (Repl. Vol.
2004), 63.2-1916 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(C)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
113. Id.
114. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 907, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-108.2(D) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
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and payment schedule of medical and dental expenses in sole and
split custody arrangements is now identical to that for shared
custody arrangements. 1 ' Under the shared custody arrangement,
expenses are allocated in accordance with the parties' income
shares and paid in addition to the basic child support obliga-
tion.116 Courts are directed, "upon a showing of the tax savings a
party derives from child-care deductions or credits... [to] factor
actual tax consequences into its calculations of the child-care
costs to be added to the basic child support obligation.""7 These
guidelines will be reviewed every four years."'
In Newman v. Newman,"9 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
dealt with the legal effect of a consent decree entered to amend
spousal and child support.'2 ° The parties had come before the trial
court for a hearing on a "Motion to Amend Spousal Support and
Child Support;" however, they advised the court that they had re-
solved their differences and presented an agreed order "by coun-
sel." '2 Less than five months later, the husband filed a "Motion to
Eliminate and/or Reduce Spousal Support," arguing that "the
[earlier] agreement could be judicially terminated or modified be-
cause (i) it was signed by counsel ... rather than by the clients
themselves, and (ii) it included an express provision contractually
authorizing judicial termination or modification."'22 The trial
court denied the motion and ruled that the order signed by coun-
sel was the "parties' order," which could not be changed.'23 The
court of appeals agreed that the decree was signed by both par-
ties' lawyers acting with "actual authority" and thus satisfied the
court's signature requirements. 24 However, the dissent argued
that the signed order was simply a resolution of the issues cur-
rently in dispute before the court, based on a modifiable order,
115. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(D) (Repl. Vol. 2004) with VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
108.2(G)(1) and § 108.2(G)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2004) and § 20-108.2(G)(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(D) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
117. Id. § 20-108.2(F) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
118. Id. § 20-108.2(H) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
119. 42 Va. App. 557, 593 S.E.2d 533 (Ct. App. 2004).
120. Id. at 561-62, 593 S.E.2d at 535-36.
121. Id. at 561, 593 S.E.2d at 535.
122. Id. at 561-62, 593 S.E.2d at 535-36.
123. Id. at 562, 593 S.E.2d at 536.
124. Id. at 568, 593 S.E.2d at 539.
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and thus was not a "stipulation or contract" foreclosing later
modification.'25
In Smith v. Smith 26 the court ruled that the merger of an
agreement, which was silent on the issue providing for spousal
support, with a divorce decree, did not make the agreement sub-
ject to termination upon cohabitation.'27
I. Child Custody and Visitation
1. Generally
In Kane v. Szymczak 28 the Court of Appeals of Virginia re-
versed the trial court's decision, which transferred custody of the
parties' two minor children from the mother to the father, be-
cause the court did not specify the grounds for its decision, as re-
quired by section 20-124.3 of the Virginia Code. 29 At the same
time, the court affirmed the lower court's order refusing to award
attorney's fees to the father and directing him to pay the guard-
ian ad litem's fees.1 30
In Roberts v. Roberts,'31 the mother "filed a motion to suspend
or modify [her] former husband's visitation with their minor chil-
dren."32 The circuit court "awarded [the] mother sole legal and
physical custody of the children, terminated [the] father's in-
person visitation, and limited [the] father's contact with the chil-
dren to scheduled, telephonic visits." 3 3 The evidence at the mo-
tion hearing revealed that the two children complained of "physi-
cal ailments immediately prior to their having to leave for
visitation with [their] father." 34 Furthermore, the children testi-
125. Id. at 579, 593 S.E.2d at 544.
126. 41 Va. App. 742, 589 S.E.2d 439 (Ct. App. 2003).
127. Id. at 751, 589 S.E.2d at 443.
128. 41 Va. App. 365, 585 S.E.2d 349 (Ct. App. 2003).
129. Id. at 374, 585 S.E.2d at 354.
130. Id. at 376, 585 S.E.2d at 355. See also Lanzalotti v. Lanzalotti, 41 Va. App. 550,
555-56, 586 S.E.2d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 2003) (following Kane and reversing the trial court's
custody order which failed to properly communicate to the parties the basis for it's deci-
sion pursuant to the Virginia Code).
131. 41 Va. App. 513, 586 S.E.2d 290 (Ct. App. 2003).
132. Id. at 513, 586 S.E.2d at 290.
133. Id. at 522, 586 S.E.2d at 294.
134. Id. at 519, 586 S.E.2d at 293.
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fled that the father told them their mother was a fornicator and
adulterer, was the "devil," and was going to hell.135 A psychologist
"testified [that] the children were 'distressed' by [their] father's
proselytizing and condemnation of [their] mother."3 ' The trial
court determined "that continued in-person visitation with [the]
father [was] contrary to the children's best interests.13 v The court
of appeals affirmed the termination of visitation and the restric-
tions on telephone contact despite claims the action violated the
First Amendment.1
38
The General Assembly enacted a bill providing that, in consid-
ering the best interests of the child with respect to custody and
visitation, courts may disregard "[t]he propensity of each parent
to actively support the child's contact and relationship with the
other parent," if there is "any history of family abuse."139 In re-
gard to the requirement that parties in custody cases show they
have participated in parenting classes, 4 ° the General Assembly
provided that "the court may require the parties to attend such
seminar or program in uncontested cases only if the court finds
good cause." 4
The General Assembly created a special rate for filing fees in
custody and visitation proceedings, barring any add-on fees in
these cases.1 42 The special rate for appeals applies, thus avoiding
multiple fees where there is more than one child involved in a
case or if both custody and visitation are involved. 4 3
135. Id. The father and his new wife were very religious and insisted that the children
read the Bible and do chores while they were visiting. Id.
136. Id. at 520-21, 586 S.E.2d at 294.
137. Id. at 527, 586 S.E.2d at 297.
138. Id. In another case raising similar First Amendment questions, a federal district
judge sitting in Virginia upheld the constitutionality of the International Parental Kid-
napping Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (2000), and its application to an Iranian father for
retaining his daughter in Iran with the intent to obstruct the mother's lawful custody
right. United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723, 736 (E.D.Va. 2003).
139. Act of Mar. 29, 2004, ch. 221, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-124.3(6), (9) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.15 (Supp. 2004).
141. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 732, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16.1-278.15(A) (Supp. 2004), 20-103(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
142. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 727, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-69.48:5 (Supp. 2004)).
143. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-296, -296.2 (Supp. 2004).
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2. Custodian Relocation
During the past year, three cases addressed the difficult issue
of custodian relocation. In Petry v. Petry'" the Court of Appeals of
Virginia affirmed the trial court's decision, which granted the
mother permission to relocate from Lynchburg, Virginia, to Long
Island, New York, where the children had spent much of their
time in their early years.145 The father spent little time with the
children, committed adultery with one of his employees and be-
came increasingly detached from his family.'46
In Sullivan v. Jones,47 the court of appeals considered the case
for the second time, having reversed the circuit court's previous
order allowing the mother to relocate to South Carolina. 48 Upon
remand, the mother petitioned the court for a second time seek-
ing permission to stay in South Carolina, which the circuit court
granted. 4 The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing with the cir-
cuit court that the child's best interests would be served by re-
maining in South Carolina in light of the changed circumstances
from the first case.'50 Relocation was also permitted in Wheeler v.
Wheeler."'5 In this case, the mother had significant financial prob-
lems residing in northern Virginia, where the father lived, and
desired to move to Florida to re-marry and provide a better life
for the children in a more economically secure setting. 152 The
court of appeals found that the economic distress the mother and
children were experiencing constituted a material change in cir-
cumstances and, therefore, the trial court did not err in finding
relocation to be in the children's best interests.
153
144. 41 Va. App. 782, 589 S.E.2d 458 (Ct. App. 2003).
145. Id. at 793, 796, 589 S.E.2d at 464-65.
146. Id. at 787, 589 S..E.2d at 460-61.
147. 42 Va. App. 794, 595 S.E.2d 36 (Ct. App. 2004).
148. Id. at 799, 595 S.E.2d at 38; see Sullivan v. Knick, 38 Va. App. 773, 784-85, 568
S.E.2d 430, 435-36 (Ct. App. 2002).
149. 42 Va. App. at 802, 595 S.E.2d at 40.
150. Id. at 812, 595 S.E.2d at 45.
151. 42 Va. App. 282, 591 S.E.2d 698 (Ct. App. 2004).
152. Id. at 286-87, 591 S.E.2d at 700-01.
153. Id. at 294, 591 S.E.2d at 704.
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3. Grandparent or Third-Party Visitation or Custody
In Long v Holt-Tillman, 5 4 the child had lived with the grand-
mother for most of her life,'55 and the grandmother filed a com-
plaint with Child Protective Services (CPS) against the natural
parents.1 6 During the ensuing investigation, the mother signed a
consent order awarding joint legal custody of the child to herself
and the grandmother and awarding sole physical custody to the
grandmother.'57 The trial court ruled, and the court of appeals
agreed, that this consent order, even though intended to be tem-
porary, was a voluntary relinquishment of physical custody, thus
making the parental presumption inapplicable. 5 ' In light of the
strong relationship the child had with the grandmother, the sta-
ble living environment she enjoyed with her, and the history with
the natural parents, the circuit court's order was not an abuse of
discretion. 15
In Harris v. Boxler, 60 the trial court correctly found that there
was "virtually no evidence" to show that the grandmother's visi-
tation with her granddaughter would be in the child's best inter-
ests since her son was incarcerated for sexually assaulting the
child's mother.' 6 ' In O'Leary v. Moore, 62 the court of appeals ruled
that the trial court properly denied a maternal grandmother's pe-
tition for visitation of her grandchild where the father, the child's
surviving parent, was a fit parent.'63 Furthermore, there was no
showing of "actual harm to the child's health or welfare without
such visitation."" Finally, in Crawley v. Ford6 the court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's order awarding legal and primary
custody to the father and his wife based on an "agreement" with
154. No. 1434-03-3, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 239 (Ct. App. May 25, 2004) (unpublished
decision).
155. Id. at *2.
156. Id. at *4.
157. Id.
158. Id. at *12.
159. Id. at *18.
160. No. 0604-03-3, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 461 (Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2003) (unpublished de-
cision).
161. Id. at *10.
162. No. 3187-02-2, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 391 (Ct. App. July 8, 2003) (unpublished de-
cision).
163. Id. at *3.
164. Id. at *2.
165. 43 Va. App. 308, 597 S.E.2d 264 (Ct. App. 2004).
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the maternal grandmother, who had cared for the child much of
her life.166 The court of appeals found that the grandmother
"failed to provide an adequate record to enable us to consider her
arguments on appeal."167
In an unusual case, Griffin v. Griffin,16 the court of appeals
ruled that the trial court had applied the wrong standard in
awarding non-parent visitation to the mother's estranged hus-
band, after a paternity test established that another man was the
biological father, and it reversed the lower court's judgment. 6 9
The appropriate standard required clear and convincing evidence
of actual harm to the child, by denying visitation, rather than the
more customary "best interests" standard.17
K. Adoption
Legislation enacted in 2004 that impacts the adoption process
requires any child-placing agency "outside the Commonwealth, or
its agent, [that] executes an entrustment agreement in the Com-
monwealth with a birth parent for the termination of all parental
rights and responsibilities with respect to a child" to comply with
the Commonwealth's laws regarding entrustment agreements,
revocations of agreements, and birth parent counseling.171 Any
entrustment agreement that fails to follow such requirements is
void. 72 An Attorney General's opinion concluded that "a step-
child, that has not been adopted by the stepparent, is not the 'off-
spring' of a stepparent and, therefore, is not included in the legal
definition of 'member of the immediate family' for purposes of §
15.2-2244(A)" when dealing with the family exception to the sub-
division of lots or parcels of land. 73
166. Id. at 309-10, 597 S.E.2d at 265.
167. Id. at 310, 597 S.E.2d at 265.
168. 41 Va. App. 77, 581 S.E.2d 899 (Ct. App. 2003).
169. Id. at 86, 581 S.E.2d at 903.
170. Id. at 85, 581 S.E.2d at 903.
171. Act of April 14, 2004, ch. 815, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 63.2-1200, -1221, -1222, -1817 (Cum. Supp. 2004)). The bill also added the re-
quirement that "an entrustment agreement for the termination of all parental rights and
responsibilities shall be executed in writing and notarized." Id.
172. Id.
173. Op. to Donald D. Litten, County Attorney for Shenandoah County (Mar. 23, 2004),
available at http://www.oag.state.va.us (last visited Sept. 24, 2004). Addressing name
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IV. DELINQUENCY AND CHILDREN IN NEED OF SUPERVISION
A. Juvenile Death Penalty
The juvenile death penalty returned to the public eye this year
with the high profile trial of Lee Boyd Malvo, who was charged as
a juvenile for capital murder.174 The issue will most likely con-
tinue to be one of great interest on both the state and the national
level, based on the recent acts of both the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Supreme Court of Virginia.
In Johnson v. Commonwealth,175 the Supreme Court of Virginia
confirmed a death sentence imposed in a capital murder case in-
volving a defendant who was sixteen years old at the time of the
offense.176 The court considered a range of issues, including the
question of whether the circuit court erred in refusing to impose a
life sentence pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia."' Because the court
found the defendant's claim of mental retardation to be frivolous,
it affirmed the death sentence. 7 " The Supreme Court of Virginia
also ruled that "any further determination whether 16 and 17-
year-old persons convicted of capital murder should be eligible to
receive the death penalty in Virginia is a matter to be decided by
the General Assembly, not by the courts." 79
Nonetheless, the court's statement should not deter any lawyer
representing a juvenile defendant facing a capital murder charge
changes after adoption, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that a circuit court erred in
granting a petition by the child's biological father, who was never married to the mother,
to change the child's surname to his own. Spero v. Heath, 267 Va. 477, 480-81, 593 Va.
239, 240-41 (2004). The court found that the father had not successfully carried the bur-
den of proving that the name change was in the best interest of the child, in light of the
criteria delineated by prior cases. Id. at 80, 593 Va. at 240; see, e.g., Flowers v. Cain, 218
Va. 234, 237 S.E.2d 111 (1977).
174. On May 5, 2004, Lee Boyd Malvo was sentenced to life in prison without parole for
his involvement in the October 14, 2002 shooting of an FBI analyst. Sniper Malvo Sen-
tenced to Life Without Parole (May 5, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/10/
sniper.malvo/index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2004).
175. 267 Va. 53, 591 S.E.2d 47 (2004).
176. Id. at 57, 62, 591 S.E.2d at 49, 51.
177. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded individuals is
cruel and unusual punishment). For an in-depth discussion of the Court's decision in At-
kins, see Jaime L. Henshaw, Note, Atkins v. Virginia: The Court's Failure to Recognize
What Lies Beneath, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 1185 (2003).
178. Johnson, 267 Va. at 75, 591 S.E.2d at 59.
179. 267 Va. at 76, 591 S.E.2d at 60.
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in the Commonwealth from challenging the penalty on constitu-
tional grounds. After fifteen years since last taking up the issue
of the juvenile death penalty,"' ° the Supreme Court of the United
States granted a writ of certiorari to review the Supreme Court of
Missouri's decision overturning a juvenile's death sentence as
cruel and unusual punishment. 18' The case, Roper v. Simmons, is
set to be heard by the Court in the October 2004 term'82 and will
certainly have an impact on any attorney representing juvenile
clients in capital cases.
B. Confessions
In Yarborough v. Alvarado,' The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed a decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit granting habeas corpus relief to a state pris-
oner who was convicted of murder committed as a minor and who
had confessed to the crime during an interrogation without being
advised of his Miranda"s rights.8 5 The court of appeals granted
relief because it felt the state courts had erred by failing to take
into account Alvarado's age and inexperience when determining
whether a reasonable person would have thought he was in cus-
tody.186 The clearly established law of the Supreme Court con-
cerning juvenile status compelled "the extension of the principle
that juvenile status is relevant" to a Miranda custody determina-
tion; therefore, the federal courts did not need to give deference to
the state court determinations on habeas review.1 7 The Supreme
Court determined that the California court's application of
"clearly established law was reasonable" because, even without
the deference requirement mandated by the federal Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act,' "it can be said that fair-
180. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of
capital punishment for youths sixteen years of age or older).
181. See Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1171
(2004).
182. Id.
183. 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004).
184. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
185. Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2144.
186. Alvarodo v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 843-44 (9th Cir. 2002).
187. Id. at 853.
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000). Under the AEPPA, a federal court can grant an ap-
plication for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person held pursuant to a state court
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minded jurists could disagree over whether Alvarado was in cus-
tody."189 The Court listed several factors that pointed to him being
in custody:
Comstock [the officer] interviewed Alvarado at the police station.
The interview lasted two hours ... [and] Comstock did not tell Alva-
rado that he was free to leave. Alvarado was brought to the police
station by his legal guardians rather than arriving on his own ac-
cord ... [and] Alvarado's parents asked to be present at the inter-
view but were rebuffed .... 190
On the other hand, there were other factors that pointed to Al-
varado not being in custody:
The police did not transport Alvarado to the station or require him to
appear at a particular time. They did not threaten him or suggest he
would be placed under arrest. Alvarado's parents remained in the
lobby during the interview, suggesting that the interview would be
brief. In fact, according to trial counsel for Alvarado, he and his par-
ents were told that the interview was "not going to be long." During
the interview, Comstock focused on Soto's crimes rather than Alva-
rado's. Instead of pressuring Alvarado with the threat of arrest and
prosecution, she appealed to his interest in telling the truth and be-
ing helpful to a police officer. In addition, Comstock twice asked Al-
varado if he wanted to take a break. At the end of the interview, Al-
varado went home.191
The Court concluded that the state court acted reasonably and
the Ninth Circuit should not have granted habeas corpus relief..92
On the substantive issue of whether age should be a factor in the
determination of whether a suspect is "in custody," Justice Ken-
nedy, writing for the majority, applied an objective test, 9 3 while
Justice Breyer's dissent urged a more subjective standard that
would consider the suspect's youth in determining what a reason-
able person would think. 94 Justice O'Connor, concurring, stated
that
judgment if the state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States." Id.
189. Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2149.
190. Id. at 2150.
191. Id. at 2149-50 (citations omitted).
192. Id. at 2152.
193. Id. at 2151-52.
194. Id. at 2153-56.
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[t]here may be cases in which a suspect's age will be relevant to the
Miranda "custody" inquiry. In this case, however, Alvarado was al-
most 18 years old at the time of his interview. It is difficult to expect
police to recognize that a suspect is a juvenile when he is so close to
the age of majority. 1
95
In J.D. v. Commonwealth,196 a fourteen-year-old juvenile de-
fendant was convicted of petit larceny for a theft that occurred at
his high school.'97 The critical evidence against him was a state-
ment he made during questioning by an associate principal at the
school, in the presence of the principal and the school resource po-
lice officer. 9 ' The court concluded that he was not entitled to any
Miranda warning prior to questioning by the associate principal,
that his statements were both voluntary and admissible, and that
the youth's "subjective concern that he might have received some
disciplinary action" if he refused to answer questions was insuffi-
cient to establish any coercion or compulsion against his will.' 99
The court of appeals said that "a school principal or other school
official who questions a student about a possible violation of law
or school regulation does not, absent other circumstances, act as a
law enforcement officer or agent of the state with law enforce-
ment authority."200
Furthermore, "[wihile the security officer was present in the
room, he made no show of authority suggesting that J.D. was un-
der arrest or not free to leave ... [and his] mere presence during
Wright's questioning did not convert the questioning into a custo-
dial interrogation by a law enforcement officer."201 Regarding
J.D.'s concern about likely administrative action if he refused to
cooperate, the court of appeals stated that the "subjective concern
that he might have received some disciplinary action is not suffi-
195. Id. at 2152.
196. 42 Va. App. 329, 591 S.E.2d 721 (Ct. App. 2004). For further discussion of this
case, see Mara G. Decker & Stephen R. McCullough, Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
Criminal Law and Procedure, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 133, 146 (2004).
197. Id. at 332, 591 S.E.2d at 723.
198. Id. at 32-33, 591 S.E.2d at 723. During the interview in question, the student was
neither told he could not leave the office, nor was he physically restrained. Id. at 333, 591
S.E.2d at 723.
199. Id. at 341, 591 S.E.2d at 727.
200. Id. at 335, 591 S.E.2d at 724.
201. Id. at 337, 591 S.E.2d at 725.
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cient to prove that state action coerced or compelled him to an-
swer questions against his will."2"2
C. Right to Counsel
An important piece of legislation enacted in 2004 requires the
appointment of an attorney for a child prior to the initial deten-
tion hearing, unless counsel already has been retained and ap-
pears on behalf of the child;20 3 Virginia Code section 16.1-267 pro-
vides for the payment of such court-appointed attorney.2 4 The
law requires that the attorney be notified of the detention hear-
ing, and any rehearing, and specifies that the attorney "shall be
given the opportunity to be heard."20 5
The statute further provides that if the child is not released
and a parent, guardian, legal custodian or other person standing
in loco parentis is not notified and does not appear or does not
waive appearance at the hearing, upon the written request of
such person stating that such person is willing and available to
supervise the child upon release from detention and to return the
child to court for all scheduled proceedings on the pending
charges, the court shall rehear the matter on the next day on
which the court sits within the county or city wherein the charge
against the child is pending. 2 6 Furthermore, if it is determined
that the child is not indigent, the parents must pay the costs of
the attorney.2 7
Of special significance, Virginia Code section 16.1-266 states
that a child who is alleged to have committed an offense that
could lead to commitment in a juvenile correctional center may
not waive his right to an attorney unless he or she has consulted
with a lawyer.208
202. Id. at 341, 591 S.E.2d at 727.
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(B) (Supp. 2004). This code section does not take effect
until July 1, 2005. Id.
204. Id. § 16.1-267(B) (Supp. 2004). This code section does not take effect until July 1,
2005. Id.
205. Id § 16.1-250(C)-(D) (Supp. 2004). This code section does not take effect until July
1, 2005. Id.
206. Id. § 16.1-250(H) (Supp. 2004).
207. Id. § 16.1-267(A) (Supp. 2004).
208. Id. § 16.1-266 (Supp. 2004).
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Another major piece of legislation, Virginia Code section 19.2-
163.01, established the Indigent Defense Commission. °9 The
Commission will establish criteria for the qualification of
court-appointed lawyers.210 In order to qualify as a court-
appointed lawyer in juvenile cases, an attorney must have com-
pleted six hours of continuing legal education approved by the
Commission, as well as four hours of instruction specifically fo-
cused on juvenile court practice.21' Furthermore, as discussed
above, the recent legislation also extends the ability of lawyers to
access health and other records while representing juveniles.1 2
This recent amendment serves to equalize the right of access by
counsel in delinquency cases with that already enjoyed by guard-
ians ad litem.1 3
D. Intake, .Detention, and Pretrial Matters
The General Assembly made several changes to the Virginia
Code dealing with juvenile intake. One amendment permits a ju-
venile intake officer to proceed informally against a juvenile,
more than once, where the juvenile is alleged to have committed
an offense that would be, at the most, a Class 1 misdemeanor if
committed by an adult or is alleged to have committed a status
offense.1 4 Also, an intake officer is required to notify the school
division superintendent of the filing of a petition against a juve-
nile in cases involving criminal street gang activity.215
An amendment to detention provisions in the Virginia Code al-
lows juvenile intake officers and magistrates to order confine-
ment of a person eighteen years of age or older in a jail rather
than a juvenile detention home for an offense that occurred prior
to the person reaching the age of eighteen.216 Another amendment
209. Id. § 19.2-163.01 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
210. Id. The Commission will also assume the duties of the existing Public Defender
Commission, which was abolished by the bill. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 921, 2004 Va. Acts
- (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-163.01, -163.02 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
211. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.03(C) (Repl. Vol. 2004). This code section does not take
effect until July 1, 2005. Id.
212. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(G) (Supp. 2004).
213. See id.
214. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 309, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-260 (Supp. 2004)).
215. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-260(G)(11) (Supp. 2004).
216. Id. § 16.1-249(H) (Supp. 2004).
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provides that a juvenile's probation officer may search for less re-
strictive alternatives when a juvenile is detained in a local deten-
tion facility.217 In a further effort to reduce the detention of juve-
niles in Virginia, the General Assembly amended the Virginia
Code to require a circuit court, when practicable, to hear an ap-
peal of a juvenile court's transfer decision within forty-five days
after transfer from the juvenile court. 218 The court must hold a
hearing, when practicable, on the merits of any appeal of a juve-
nile court finding of delinquency or disposition within forty-five
days of its filing, if the juvenile is in a secure facility pending ap-
peal. 2
19
A juvenile held continuously in secure detention shall be released
from confinement if there is no hearing on the merits of his case
within 45 days of the filing of the appeal. The circuit court may ex-
tend the time limitations for a reasonable period of time based upon
good cause shown .... 220
The court must document the extension in the case record.22 '
The General Assembly also eliminated language in Virginia Code
section 16.1-275 that authorized the placement of a juvenile who
is alleged to be a child in need of services in the temporary cus-
tody of the Department of Juvenile Justice for evaluation pur-
poses, something that already existed in practice.222
E. Transfer and Certification for Trial as an Adult
As almost a decade has passed since the initial major revisions
to the transfer statutes in 1994, the number of cases addressing
transfer and certification issues has dropped considerably. Only a
handful of cases were decided in the past year, and there were no
legislative changes.
217. Id. § 16.1-248.1(C) (Supp. 2004).
218. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 468, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-269.6(B) (Supp. 2004)).
219. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.6(B) (2004 Supp.).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 321, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-275 (Supp. 2004)).
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In Cook v. Commonwealth,223 a juvenile's past certification as
an adult by the juvenile court established his status as an adult,
pursuant to Virginia Code section 16.1-271, for the jurisdictional
purposes of the instant case.224 The juvenile was considered an
adult in the circuit court where he was indicted and arraigned.225
Although those charges were dismissed by nolle prosequi, he was
nonetheless treated as an adult during the pendency of those pro-
ceedings according to the language of Virginia Code section 16.1-
27 1.226 Because of his previous treatment as an adult, the juvenile
courts were precluded from exercising jurisdiction over him in re-
lation to the current charges because he had been previously
treated as an adult,227 and, therefore, the circuit court properly
acquired jurisdiction.22 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
convictions in Schwartz v. Commonwealth,229 where the juvenile
defendant was convicted as an adult of three separate counts of
arson. 231 The personal property items burned were located in a
residential driveway. 231 The fire began in a pick-up truck, spread
to a sport utility vehicle and then to the house.232 The three burn-
ings were separate and distinct offenses and could be prosecuted
as such.233 The juvenile appealed the ruling that treated the burn-
ing objects as separate arson counts.2 34 The supreme court upheld
the ruling.235
223. 268 Va. 111, 597 S.E.2d 84 (2004).
224. Id. at 113, 116, 597 S.E.2d at 85, 87. The juvenile had been certified by the circuit
court; however, his charges were dismissed nolle prosequi by the grand juries. Id. at 113,
597 S.E.2d at 85.
225. Id.
226. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-271 (Repl. Vol. 2003).
227. Cook, 268 Va. at 114, 597 S.E.2d at 86,
228. Id. at 116, 597 S.E.2d at 87.
229. 267 Va. 751, 594 S.E.2d 925 (2004). For addition discussion, see Decker & McCul-
lough, supra note 196, at 164.
230. Id. at 752-53, 594 S.E.2d at 926.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 753, 594 S.E.2d at 926.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 755, 594 S.E.2d at 927.
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F. Adjudication and Disposition
In Jarrett v. Commonwealth,236 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the appeal was without merit.237 Jarrett sought credit
for time served.238 The circuit judge had already given Jarrett the
relief she sought, providing in the sentencing order that the De-
partment of Juvenile Justice give her credit for the time she had
served in pretrial detention, even though there was no statutory
authority for that action in an indeterminate commitment.239 Leg-
islation adopted in 2004 requires that, for a juvenile eleven years
of age or older to be committed to the Department of Juvenile
Justice for an offense that would be a Class 1 misdemeanor if
committed by an adult, the juvenile must have previously been
adjudicated a delinquent on three separate occasions.24 °
G. Juvenile Court Records and Confidentiality
In Williams v. Commonwealth,24' the defendant, an adult,
sought to use a prosecution witness's juvenile convictions to at-
tack his credibility, rather than to demonstrate that the witness
was biased.242 Under a long line of precedential cases, the trial
judge properly limited the questioning.2 43
The General Assembly mandated the taking of fingerprints and
photographs of any juvenile taken into custody and charged with
a delinquent act if the charge is one that has to be reported to the
Central Criminal Records Exchange.2  If the juvenile is found not
guilty, the fingerprints and photographs are destroyed.245 If the
236. No. 1390-02-2, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 503 (Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2003) (unpublished de-
cision).
237. Id. at *4.
238. Id. at *3-4.
239. Id. at *4-5. The court stated that Virginia Code section 53.1-187 had no applica-
bility to adults. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-187 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
240. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 325, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-278.8(14) (Supp. 2004)).
241. No. 0170-03-1, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 695 (Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003) (unpublished
decision).
242. Id. at *2-3.
243. Id. at *3-4.
244. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 464, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-299(B) (Supp. 2004)).
245. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-299(C) (Supp. 2004).
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juvenile was charged with a violent juvenile felony, the records
are maintained in the Central Criminal Records Exchange and
the juvenile court.246 Another amendment to the juvenile code au-
thorizes the Commonwealth's Attorney to obtain from a juvenile
court papers filed in connection with a juvenile adjudication of
guilt for an offense "that would be a felony if committed by an
adult" for use as "evidence in a pending criminal prosecution for a
violation of § 18.2-308.2"--possession or transportation of fire-
arms, stun weapons, tasers, or concealed weapons by a convicted
felon.247
H. Criminal Street Gangs
One issue addressed by the General Assembly was the in-
volvement of juveniles in criminal street gangs.248 Virginia Code
section 16.1-330.1 was amended so that juveniles who have been
convicted of a criminal street gang felony are considered serious
juvenile offenders and qualify for the Serious or Habitual Of-
fender Comprehensive Action Program ("SHOCAP").249 Previ-
ously, the only way a juvenile could qualify was if they had been
convicted of three felonies or misdemeanors, unless the felonies
were murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, or malicious
wounding.2 ° Another amendment makes it a Class 1 misde-
meanor to recruit a person into a criminal street gang; an adult
recruiting a minor is a Class 6 felony.' It is now a Class 6 felony
to encourage a person to become a gang member through the use,
or threat, of force against that person or another person.2  Fur-
thermore, a third or subsequent conviction within ten years of
246. Id.
247. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 446, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-305(D1) (Supp. 2004)). The legislation also allows a bail bondsman to know
the status of his bond on a juvenile without obtaining access to any other part of the juve-
nile's record. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-305(c) (Supp. 2004).
248. For a further discussion of the criminal law implications of these recent amend-
ments, see Decker & McCullough, supra note 196, at 178-79.
249. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 418, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-330.1(A) (Supp. 2004)). SHOCAP is a program providing control, supervision,
and treatment for serious or habitual juvenile offenders. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-330.1(B)
(Supp. 2004).
250. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-330.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
251. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
252. Id. § 18.2-46.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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prohibited criminal street gang participation or recruitment is a
Class 3 felony.253
I. Weapons Issues
The General Assembly enacted legislation allowing a locality to
regulate or restrict the use of pneumatic guns by ordinance.254
This includes requiring that minors under the age of sixteen have
adult supervision when using pneumatic guns,255 although "[n]o
such ordinance... shall prohibit the use of pneumatic guns at fa-
cilities approved for shooting ranges or on other property where
firearms may be discharged."256 "Commercial or private areas des-
ignated for use of pneumatic paintball guns may be established,"
but such areas must provide protective equipment for the face
and ears of participants, and "signs must be posted to warn
against entry into the paintball area" by unprotected persons. 2 7 If
a school operates a Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps
("JROTC") program, the school cannot "prohibit the JROTC pro-
gram from conducting marksmanship training when such train-
ing is a normal element of such programs.... The administration
of a school operating a JROTC program shall cooperate with the
JROTC staff in implementing such marksmanship training."25
Another amendment was enacted clearly to authorize school
divisions to establish disciplinary policies prohibiting the posses-
sion of firearms "on school property, school buses, and at
school-sponsored activities" by students.25 9 It authorizes school
divisions to take disciplinary actions against students who violate
253. Id. § 18.2-46.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
254. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 930, 2004 Va. Acts ___ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-
915.4 (Supp. 2004)). The Virginia Code Commission changed the numbering of this sec-
tion. The General Assembly originally numbered this section as 15.2-915.2; however, since
section 15.2-915.2 already existed in the Code, and the General Assembly did not intend to
repeal this section, the Virginia Code Commission renumbered the new section as section
15.2-915.4. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915.4 (Supp. 2004).
255. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915.4(A) (Supp. 2004).
256. Id. § 15.2-915.4(B) (Supp. 2004).
257. Id. § 15.2-915.4(D) (Supp. 2004). A pneumatic gun means "any implement, de-
signed as a gun, that will expel a BB or a pellet by action of pneumatic pressure." Id. §
15.2-915.4(E) (Supp. 2004). The definitions of other types of firearms are clarified to dis-
tinguish between firearms and pneumatic guns. Id. § 18.2-299 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
258. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277.07(D) (Supp. 2004).
259. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 560, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
277.07:1 (Supp. 2004)).
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such policies.26 ° This measure will allow school boards to establish
policies to discipline students who carry weapons on school prop-
erty, including an unloaded firearm in a closed container. The bill
was in response to an October 2003 opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral indicating that
a school board has authority to discipline, in the context of the com-
plete analysis herein, a student whose action is in conformance with
the language of Chapter 619 of the 2003 Acts of Assembly which
amends and reenacts § 18.2-308.1(B), pertaining to the possession of
an unloaded firearm in a locked vehicle trunk.
26 1
While noting that the 2003 legislation is not a model of clarity,
the Attorney General stated that
[a]s long as the regulations of the school authorities are not inconsis-
tent with the 2003 amendment, school authorities are authorized to
promulgate reasonable regulations that may result in the discipline
of a student whose action is in conformance with the language of the
2003 amendment pertaining to the possession of an unloaded fire-
arm.
2 6 2
The 2004 legislation attempts to clarify the extent of the au-
thority of school divisions. In Esteban v. Commonwealth,263 the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the lower court's ruling, hold-
ing that the statute proscribing possession of a firearm on school
property is "one of strict criminal liability, and that the Com-
monwealth was required to prove only that the defendant had
possessed, on school property, a firearm of the type described in
the statute."26 a
260. Id.
261. Op. to Hon. Kevin G. Miller, Member, Senate of Virginia (Oct. 15, 2003), available
at http://www.oag.state.va.us (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
262. Id.
263. 266 Va. 605, 587 S.E.2d 523 (2003).
264. Id. at 610, 587 S.E.2d at 526. Although Esteban was not a juvenile, the case is in-
cluded here because the charge is frequently placed against juveniles.
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V. ABUSE OR NEGLECT AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Civil Handling of Abuse or Neglect Matters
In Mulvey v. Jones,265 the Court of Appeals of Virginia agreed
that substantial evidence supported the circuit court's finding
that an injury inflicted by a teacher on a student constituted
physical abuse, and was not simply accidental.266 In another fed-
eral civil rights case, Gedrich v. Fairfax County Department of
Family Services,267 a family's federal and state claims against
various social service agencies and individuals, which were con-
nected to the allegedly false allegations of sexual abuse that re-
sulted in the daughter's three-month separation from her family,
were dismissed on immunity and statute of limitations
grounds.2 8 Some of the private individuals were retained, how-
ever, in the pending case.269
Addressing a persistent issue, the Attorney General of Virginia
issued an opinion ruling that "a juvenile court judge has the au-
thority to order a local board of social services to accept a noncus-
todial entrustment of a child found to be in need of services."27 °
The General Assembly amended the definition of child abuse
and neglect to include
a child who is with his parent or other person responsible for his care
either (i) during the manufacture or attempted manufacture of a
Schedule I or II controlled substance, or (ii) during the unlawful sale
of such substance by that child's parents or other person responsible
for his care, where such manufacture, or attempted manufacture or
unlawful sale would constitute a felony.
271
Another amendment provides that in civil proceedings involv-
ing child abuse, neglect, or abandonment
265. 41 Va. App. 600, 587 S.E.2d 728 (Ct. App. 2003).
266. Id. at 604, 587 S.E.2d at 730.
267. 282 F. Supp. 2d 439 (E.D. Va. 2003).
268. Id. at 439-40, 479-80.
269. Id. at 479-80.
270. Op. to Hon. Frank D. Hargrove, Sr., Member, House of Delegates (Mar. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.oag.state.va.us (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
271. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 753, 2004 Va. Acts -_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-228(1) (Supp. 2004)).
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based solely on the parent having left the child at a hospital or res-
cue squad, it shall be an affirmative defense that such parent safely
delivered the child to a hospital that provides 24-hour emergency
services or to an attended rescue squad that employs emergency
medical technicians, within 14 days of the child's birth.
Addressing the responsibility of teachers with respect to child
abuse, another enactment requires
[elach public school board and each administrator of every private or
parochial school shall post... a notice... that: (i) any teacher or
other person employed in a public or private school.., is required to
report such suspected cases of child abuse or neglect to local or state
social services agencies or the person in charge of the relevant school
or his designee; and (ii)... [that they] are immune from civil or
criminal liability or administrative penalty or sanction on account of
such reports unless such person has acted in bad faith or with mali-
cious purpose.
273
The General Assembly also added legislation requiring the
Child Protective Services Unit to establish standards of training
"regarding the legal duties of the [child protective services] work-
ers in order to protect the constitutional and statutory rights and
safety of children and families from the initial time of contact
during investigation through treatment."274 Virginia Code section
63.2-1503 was amended to require
[t]he local department [to] notify the custodial parent and make rea-
sonable efforts to notify the noncustodial parent ... of a report of
suspected abuse or neglect of a child who is the subject of an investi-
gation or is receiving family assessment, in those cases in which
such custodial or noncustodial parent is not the subject of the inves-
tigation.
275
272. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 245, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-228(5) (Supp. 2004)). For the purposes of terminating parental rights and
placing a child for adoption, a court may find that the child has been neglected upon the
ground of abandonment. Id.
273. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 752, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
22.1-291.3 (Supp. 2004)). "The notice shall also include the Virginia Department of Social
Services' toll-free child abuse and neglect hotline." VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-291.3 (Supp.
2004).
274. Act of Mar. 29, 2004, ch. 233, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1502(b) (Cum. Supp. 2004)). The legislation also requires local departments of
social services, "at the initial time of contact with the person subject to a child abuse and
neglect investigation, [to] advise such person of the complaints or allegations made
against the person." VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1516.01 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
275. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 886, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1503(0) (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
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New legislation also enables local social services departments
to develop "multidisciplinary teams to provide consultation to the
local department during the investigation of selected cases involv-
ing child abuse or neglect, and to make recommendations regard-
ing the prosecution of such cases."276 The teams may include
"members of the medical, mental health, legal and law-
enforcement professions, including the attorney for the Common-
wealth or his designee; a local child-protective services represen-
tative; and the guardian ad litem or other court-appointed advo-
cate for the child."277
Another amendment adds to the general duties of the Advisory
Board on Child Abuse and Neglect the duty advising "the De-
partment, Board and Governor on matters concerning programs
for the prevention and treatment of abused and neglected chil-
dren and their families and child abuse and neglect issues identi-
fied by the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services."278
A further amendment changed the makeup and operations of the
Out-Of-Family Investigations Advisory Committee. 9
B. Internet Crimes Involving Children
In the state counterpart to a federal case involving the same
defendant,2"' the Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded, in
Jarrett v. Commonwealth,"" that an unknown Turkish internet
hacker was not a government agent for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses when he turned over information to law enforcement offi-
cers about Jarrett's use of the internet in connection with child
molestation.28 2
276. Act of Mar. 29, 2004, ch. 220, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1503(K) (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
277. Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1503(K) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
278. Act of Mar. 12, 2004, ch. 69, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1528 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
279. Act of Mar. 15, 2004, ch. 103, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1527(B) (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
280. United States v. Jarrett, 229 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, United States
v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Shepherd, supra note 1, at 188-89.
281. 42 Va. App. 702, 594 S.E.2d 295 (Ct. App. 2004).
282. Id. at 716-17, 594 S.E.2d at 302. For another noteworthy case decided by the court
of appeals involving the use of the internet in soliciting a child for sex acts, see Brooker v.
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 609, 587 S.E.2d 732 (Ct. App. 2003). Brooker was convicted
.of three counts of the use of a communications system for soliciting a minor in a sex
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The General assembly added to the list of those required to reg-
ister under the Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry
Act, any person who has solicited or has attempted to solicit, by
use of a communications system, certain acts that constitute vio-
lations of Virginia Code section 18.2-374.3, which makes it unlaw-
ful to use the internet as a means of taking indecent liberties
with children.2"3 Virginia Code section 18.2-374.3 was also
amended to clarify that eighteen-year-olds are covered by the
statute criminalizing the use of a communications system, such
as the internet, to solicit sexual activity with children.284
C. Other Criminal Prosecutions of Abuse or Neglect
In Guda v. Commonwealth,285 the court of appeals affirmed the
conviction of a high school security officer for taking indecent lib-
erties with a child by a person in a custodial or supervisory rela-
tionship.286 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the court of
appeals in Commonwealth v. Duncan,28 7 ruling that the defendant
was properly convicted of criminal child abuse and neglect for
putting alcoholic beverages in his infant son's bottle, after he had
deprived the child of food and drink.288 In Kelly v. Common-
wealth289 the court of appeals affirmed a father's involuntary
manslaughter and felony child neglect conviction for the death of
his twenty-one-month-old daughter. 29' The daughter was left
strapped in a car seat, in a locked van with the windows closed,
for approximately seven hours on a very hot day. 291 The court of
appeals also ruled, in Wolfe v. Commonwealth,292 that the General
crime." Id. at 611, 587 S.E.2d at 733.
283. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 444, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 9.1-902 (Cum. Supp. 2004)); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
284. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 864, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-374.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004)); see also Decker & McCullough, supra note 196, at
173.
285. 42 Va. App. 453, 592 S.E.2d 748 (Ct. App. 2004).
286. Id. at 461, 592 S.E.2d at 751-52.
287. 267 Va. 377, 593 S.E.2d 210 (2004).
288. Id. at 386, 593 S.E.2d at 215. For additional discussion of this case, see Decker &
McCullough, supra note 196, at 165-66.
289. 42 Va. App. 347, 592 S.E.2d 353 (Ct. App. 2004).
290. Id. at 351, 592 S.E.2d at 355. Her body temperature was determined to be 105.7
two hours after she was pronounced dead by emergency workers. Id.
291. Id. at 356-57, 592 S.E.2d at 357-58.
292. 42 Va. App. 776, 595 S.E.2d 27 (Ct. App. 2004).
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Assembly "did not preclude prosecution for felony child abuse...
when it provided an enhanced punishment for driving under the
influence 'while transporting a person seventeen years of age or
younger."'2 9
As in the past, a number of criminal cases came before the
court of appeals in which the victims were children. Sadly, these
cases are only the tip of the iceberg and too numerous to be de-
scribed in depth here.294
The General Assembly amended the definition of "sexual
abuse" used in criminal cases to apply to those situations where
"the complaining witness is under the age of 13, the accused
causes or assists the complaining witness to touch the accused's,
the witness's own, or another person's intimate parts or material
directly covering such intimate parts."295 Another amendment
provides that the venue for trial of "[a]ny person transporting or
attempting to transport through or across this Commonwealth,
any person for the purposes of unlawful sexual intercourse or
prostitution... [is] in any county or city in which any part of
such transportation occurred."296 A new provision states that
videotaping, photographing, or filming of a nude or undergar-
ment-clad non-consenting person under the age of eighteen, un-
der circumstances where the person would have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, is punishable as a Class 6 felony.297
Legislation successfully passed that created the crime of feti-
cide as a Class 2 felony and defined it as "unlawfully, willfully,
293. Id. at 782, 595 S.E.2d at 30.
294. See, e.g., Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 461, 592 S.E.2d 752 (Ct. App.
2004); Richardson v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 236, 590 S.E.2d 618 (Ct. App. 2004); Via
v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 164, 590 S.E.2d 583 (Ct. App. 2004); Nelson v. Common-
wealth, 41 Va. App. 716, 589 S.E.2d 23 (Ct. App. 2003); Knight v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.
App. 617, 587 S.E.2d 736 (Ct. App. 2003); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 454, 585
S.E.2d 852 (Ct. App. 2003); Barrett v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 377, 585 S.E.2d 355
(Ct. App. 2003); White v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 191, 583 S.E.2d 771 (Ct. App. 2003);
Pilcher v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 158, 583 S.E.2d 70 (Ct. App. 2003).
295. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 741, 2004 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-67.10 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
296. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 869, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-359(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004)). In cases where the alleged victim is under eighteen
years of age, "when the county or city where the offense is alleged to have occurred cannot
be determined," the trial may be "in the county or city where the [victim] resided at the
time of the offense." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-359(C)(Repl. Vol. 2004).
297. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 844, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
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deliberately, maliciously and with premeditation kil[ling] the fe-
tus of another."29" The bill also provided that "[any person who
unlawfully, willfully, deliberately and maliciously kills the fetus
of another is guilty of a felony punishable by confinement in a
state correctional facility for not less than five nor more than 40
years."299
D. Missing or Abducted Children
Legislation enacted in 2004 clarified that "[tihe initial decision
to make a local or regional Amber Alert shall be at the discretion
of the local or regional law-enforcement officials," but that the lo-
cal or regional law-enforcement officials must provide information
regarding the abducted child to the State Police prior to issuing
the alert. °° Another amendment requires that local law-
enforcement agencies
shall immediately, but in all cases within two hours of receiving the
report, enter identifying and descriptive data about the child into the
Virginia Criminal Information Network and National Crime Infor-
mation Center Systems, forward the report to the Missing Children
Information Clearinghouse within the Department of State Police,
notify all other local law-enforcement agencies in the area, and initi-
ate an investigation of the case.
3 01
Another recent enactment increases from eighteen to twenty-
one years the age of a person for whom a missing child report is
filed when that person's whereabouts are unknown and the per-
son has been reported missing to a law-enforcement agency.
3 2
298. Act of May 21, 2004, ch. 1023, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (Repl. Vol. 2004)). For a further discussion of the feticide statute, see
Decker & McCullough, supra note 196, at 178.
299. Id.
300. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 270, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 52-34.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2004)). "The initial decision to make a statewide Amber
Alert shall be at the discretion of the Virginia State Police." Id.
301. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 443, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-1718 (Supp. 2004)).
302. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 248, 2004 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 52-32 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
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E. Foster Care and Termination of Parental Rights
In Harrison v. Tazewell County Department of Social Ser-
vices,3"3 the court of appeals held that the evidence was sufficient
to support the termination of Harrison's residual parental
rights. °4 There were repeated problems stemming from the
child's Down's Syndrome and special care needs, which were not
being met because of the father's persistent drug abuse, drug
dealing, and his incarceration in both the state and federal cor-
rectional systems."' By the time of the father's release, L.H.
would be almost eighteen years old and needs stability in her life
which Harrison cannot provide. °6
The court of appeals held that the termination of parental
rights in C.S. v. Virginia Beach Department of Social Services3 7
was erroneous where the evidence showed that "the mother had
substantially remedied, within twelve months, the conditions that
led to foster care placement."38 It appeared that the mother's
problems seemed to stem from her distrust of the government in
general, and, more specifically, the department of social ser-
vices.30 9 In Norfolk Division of Social Services v. Hardy,31° the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision not to termi-
nate the mother's residual parental rights.31' The petition did not
request the option of permanent foster care, only termination for
the purposes of adoption. 12 The evidence showed that the chil-
dren did very well with their current foster mother, who was un-
able to adopt them, and the foster mother got along well with the
biological mother.1 3 The court also found that the mother had not
substantially remedied the conditions that led to foster care;
303. 42 Va. App. 149, 590 S.E.2d 575 (Ct. App. 2004).
304. Id. at 159, 590 S.E.2d at 580-81.
305. See id. at 162-63, 590 S.E.2d at 582-83.
306. Id. at 162, 590 S.E.2d at 582.
307. 41 Va. App. 557, 586 S.E.2d 884 (Ct. App. 2003).
308. Id. at 557, 586 S.E.2d at 884.
309. Id. at 561, 563 n.4, 586 S.E.2d at 886, 887 n.4.
310. 42 Va. App. 546, 593 S.E.2d 528 (Ct. App. 2004).
311. Id. at 556, 593 S.E.2d at 533.
312. Id. at 548, 593 S.E.2d at 529.
313. See id at 550-51, 593 S.E.2d at 530-31.
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however, under the circumstances, termination would not have
been in the best interests of the children.314
In M.G. v. Albemarle County Department of Social Services,31
the court of appeals supported the determination that a mother's
residual parental rights should be terminated, because the
mother's federal conviction for abusive sexual contact was the
equivalent of a conviction for "felony sexual assault." '316 In Brown
v. Spotsylvania Department of Social Services,"7 the court of ap-
peals, agreeing with the circuit court, found that the Department
of Social Services "need not continue its efforts to reunite Brown
with [the child]" because of Brown's convictions for abuse and ne-
glect of another child."' The court felt that a sufficient investiga-
tion, regarding placement with family members, had been made
to justify the termination of parental rights.319
The General Assembly directed the Department of Social Ser-
vices to "establish a subsidized custody program for the benefit of
children in the custody of local boards on or after July 1, 2004,
who are living with relative caregivers and for whom reunifica-
tion with their natural parents and adoption by relatives are
ruled out as placement options."320
Within the limitations of federal funding and the subsidized custody
appropriation to the Department, the subsidized custody program
shall include:
1. A one-time only special-need payment, which shall be a lump sum
payment for expenses resulting from the assumption of care of the
child when no other resource is available to pay for such expense;
2. Services for the child, including but not limited to, short-term
casework, information and referral, and crisis intervention; and
314. Id. at 554-55, 593 S.E.2d at 532.
315. 41 Va. App. 170, 583 S.E.2d 761 (Ct. App. 2003).
316. Id. at 182-84, 583 S.E.2d at 767.
317. 43 Va. App. 205, 597 S.E.2d 214 (Ct. App. 2004).
318. Id. at 212, 597 S.E.2d at 217-18.
319. Id. at 218-19, 597 S.E.2d at 220-21.
320. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 814, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
63.2-913 (Cum. Supp. 2004)). The act "shall not become effective unless federal funds are
made available through a federal Title IV-E waiver and an appropriation of funds effectu-
ating the purposes of this act is included in" the biennial budget passed by the 2004 "Gen-
eral Assembly and signed into law by the Governor." Id. A relative caregiver means a per-
son, other than a natural parent, to whom the child is related by blood, marriage, or
adoption. Id.
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3. A maintenance subsidy that shall be payable monthly to the rela-
tive caregiver equal to the prevailing foster family rate to provide for
the support and care of the child.32 '
Furthermore, "the subsidized custody payment shall be made
pursuant to a subsidized custody agreement entered into between
the local board and the relative caregiver."3 22 The General As-
sembly defined the practice of kinship care as "the full-time care,
nurturing, and protection of children by relatives."3 23 Local social
services are required to "seek out kinship care options to keep
children out of foster care and as a placement option for those
children in foster care, if it is in the child's best interest."324
New legislation also provides that "a child-placing agency may
approve as a foster parent an applicant convicted of statutory
burglary for breaking and entering.., to commit larceny, who
has had his civil rights restored by the Governor, provided 25
years have elapsed following the conviction."3 2' Another amend-
ment adds foster parents to the list of persons who can certify
that a person, under eighteen, has driven for forty hours or more,
with at least ten of those hours being at night.326
F. Pre-Release Parenting Programs
In 2004, the General Assembly authorized the Department of
Correctional Education to arrange "for noncustodial parent of-
fenders committed to the custody of the Department of Correc-
tions to participate in pre-release parenting programs that in-
clude parenting skills training and anger management."327 The
programs must be administered by the Department "directly or
by contract and shall include integration with transitional pro-
grams and such other programs for offenders as may be appropri-
321. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-913(B) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
322. Id. § 63.2-913(C) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
323. Act of Mar. 12, 2004, ch. 70, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-100 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
324. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-900 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
325. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 714, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1721(F) (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
326. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 805, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.2-335 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
327. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 912, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
345.1 (Supp. 2004)).
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ate. 3 2' The individuals "may be required to establish, reestablish,
or maintain family ties and communications in order to continue
to participate in the programs. A pre-release parenting program
may be part of an offender's treatment program."329
VI. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES IN JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS LAW
A. Comprehensive Services Act
The Comprehensive Services Act was amended to add "the
chairman of the state and local advisory team" to the State Ex-
ecutive Council for Comprehensive Services for At-Risk Youth
and Families.33 ° In addition, a representative from the Depart-
ment of Medical Assistance Services was added to the state and
local advisory team.33' Another amendment provides that where a
juvenile court places a juvenile in a community or facility-based
treatment program, or a shelter care facility, in accordance with
the requirements of Virginia Code section 16.1-248.1(B), the costs
of that placement shall be funded out of the "[sitate pool of funds
for community policy and management teams."32 The General
Assembly clarified that
in any instance that an individual 18 through 21 years of age, inclu-
sive, who is eligible for funding from the state pool and is properly
defined.., pursuant to [state education law as a school-aged child
with disabilities] is placed by a local social services agency that has
custody across jurisdictional lines in a group home in the Common-
wealth and the individual's individualized education program (IEP),
as prepared by the placing jurisdiction, indicates that a private day
school placement is the appropriate educational program for such
individual, the financial and legal responsibility for the individual's
special education services and IEP shall remain, in compliance with
328. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-345.1 (Supp. 2004).
329. Id. The provisions of this act will not become effective, however, "unless an appro-
priation of general funds effectuating the purposes of this act is included in the general
appropriation act... and signed into law by the Governor." Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 912,
2004 Va. Acts -.
330. Act of Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 836, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-2648(B) (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
331. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-5201 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
332. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 286, 2004 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-5211 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
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the provisions of federal ... [and state law and regulations], the re-
sponsibility of the placing jurisdiction until the individual reaches
the age of 21, inclusive, or is no longer eligible for special education
services.
333
B. Mental Health Commitments
New legislation provides that "the juvenile and domestic rela-
tions district court serving the jurisdiction in which the minor"
requiring a mental health residential placement is located is re-
sponsible for scheduling the involuntary commitment hearing
and, for emergency admissions, the hearing shall be scheduled
where the juvenile is located or resides.334
C. Court-Related Compulsory School Attendance Issues
Virginia Code section 22.1-254 was amended to provide that ac-
tive pursuit of a general educational development (GED) certifi-
cate by persons sixteen through eighteen years of age "who are
housed in adult correctional facilities," but who "are not enrolled
in an individual student alternative education plan," will satisfy
the requirements of the compulsory school attendance law.335 The
mechanisms for enforcement of the compulsory school attendance
law were strengthened by removing the restriction on the juvenile
court's use of their contempt power when enforcing compulsory
school attendance and parental responsibility provisions.3 36 The
court's authority to order "the student or his parent to participate
in such programs... including.., extended day programs and
summer school or other education programs and counseling," is
clarified and reinforced. 337 The court is explicitly given the au-
thority to summon and force a parent to appear in court with the
child.338 The parental responsibility and involvement statute was
333. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-5211(D) (Cum. Supp. 2004). Individualized education pro-
grams are discussed in greater depth in Lacy & Mehfoud, supra note 22, at 194-95.
334. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 283, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-341 (Supp. 2004))
335. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 251, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 22.1-254, -254.2 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
336. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 573, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-241.2 (Supp. 2004)).
337. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241.2(A)(2) (Supp. 2004).
338. Id. § 16.1-263 (Supp. 2004)).
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amended to include compliance with compulsory school atten-
dance and now allows a parent to be guilty of a Class 3 misde-
meanor for violating provisions of the law.339
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union3 41 that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit was correct in affirming the district
court's ruling that enforcement of the Child Online Protection
Act341 should be enjoined because there were plausible, less re-
strictive alternatives to the Act, which did not violate the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and which would
protect minors from sexually explicit materials on the internet.342
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit ruled in PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman34 3 that the Virginia statute
which criminalized the dissemination over the Internet, for com-
mercial purposes, of materials harmful to minors 34 was unconsti-
tutionally overbroad.34'
339. Id. § 22.1-263 ( Supp. 2004)).
340. 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004).
341. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
342. Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. at 2795.
343. 362 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004).
344. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-391 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
345. PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 239. The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing
and for rehearing en banc. PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 372 F.3d 671, 671 (4th Cir. 2004).
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